The category of the public sphere does not, of course, come from Lima, 1791.
Even if it is not absolutely Habermasian, the category of the public sphere is unavoidably Habermasian, since it was Jürgen Habermas who, in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, bequeathed the most decisive historico-theoretical account of what he called Öffentlichkeit (public, state of being public, publicness, public life, public sphere). Receiving this Habermasian legacy (a legacy is always a complex inheritance that remains to be deciphered and sifted) entails, at the very least, a double risk. First, the risk of imagining that there was only ever one species of public sphere and that that species was, in its essence, bourgeois, European, emancipatory and rationalist. Taken thus, the idea of the public sphere would be one more negative verdict on a Latin America always judged to be lacking someone else's history (your public sphere wasn't very well developed, was it?). In fact, the public sphere 'blueprint', to use a word from the translation of Habermas' book, is itself not so certain. Habermas conceded that the 'bourgeois' public sphere was permeated by demands from below, outlined three different variants of the European public sphere, and has been criticised for exaggerating its emancipatory potential and failing to address the question of religion-this last, vital for any consideration of colonial Spanish America. 3 Indeed, it is worth remembering that The Structural Transformation is a lament for a European lack.
The whole of the second half of the book is a lament for a properly critical public sphere which, he believes (in 1961), Europe no longer has (Europe's public sphere has been taken over by the mass media and is thus no public sphere to speak of). Alongside any question of the adequacy of the Habermasian category of the public sphere to late colonial Lima, therefore, is the question of its adequacy to Europe. Europe, Habermas intimates, lacks its own history.
The second risk is that of imagining that there could be an alternative configuration of something approaching a public sphere which shared none of the material or symbolic DNA of the Habermasian species. Let us emancipate ourselves from other (categories of) public spheres, identify our own public sphere-Catholic, Hispanic, colonial, non-bourgeois, autochthonous even... It is as if Latin America did not have irreducible political, economic, conceptual and ethical complicities with the categories of the European tradition and the social configuration that inspired those categories (see Habermas 1999, xvii) .
Without reducing either risk, I shall suggest in what follows that a deal between the two can be brokered by foregrounding, not Habermas' political public sphere (which, by 1791, almost no country in the world had), but his more properly eighteenthcentury literary public sphere. This category is tied to a certain European social and intellectual configuration. But the category exceeds Europe, much as the phenomena it names (commercial networks, the nation-state, thinking) are not exclusive to Europe but rather are shared, with important colonial differences, by the Indies. In Habermas'
Marxist view, these phenomena amount to the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of production which determine the cultural product. His public sphere is one such generative matrix, producing Enlightenment. Habermas' key point is that this generative matrix is itself produced. Over many centuries the public sphere is produced by political, economic, social and cultural mutations. However, it will not be enough to explore the possible configuration of a colonial public sphere by turning to so-called material conditions of production without stopping to think that the cultural product itself helps produce the conditions of production. As though thinking were no kind of productive material. Habermas' 'sociology' of the public sphere itself risks downplaying one of his central claims, namely, that the public sphere consists in the public use of critical reason by private individuals. What if, then, the Mercurio Peruano were an instance, not of the consolidation of a public sphere, but of the power of (divided) critical reason to produce the conditions of and for an uncertain colonial public sphere?
Habermas' legacy
Bearing in mind what has been said above about the precariousness of the public sphere even in its heartlands, let us track Habermas (1999) Habermas' account of the European bourgeois political public sphere of the eighteenth century binds its emergence to the shift from the rule of feudal lords to the dominance of the nation-state. Politically speaking, the separation of the private and the public spheres which defines Habermas' public sphere in the modern sense occurs with the nation-state. If the notion of 'private' came to signal that which was excluded from the state sphere, the term 'public' mutated to designate all things associated with the state. This public sphere of the nation-state was different from the sphere of the sovereign. It develops, under absolutism, 'into an entity having an objective existence over against the person of the ruler' (Habermas 1999, 11) , the clearest indication of the difference being the separation of the public budget from the sovereign's private holdings. The public purse funds a permanent administration and standing army, which become public institutions separate from the private sphere of the court. In short,
Habermas' modern European public sphere belongs to the world of the modern nationstate. The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason (öffentliches Räsonnement). (27) As Calhoun (1992, 4) observes, Habermas' two-sided category of the public sphere has to do with the quantity as much as the quality of rational-critical debate, by which is meant its availability to as many people as possible.
Finally, Habermas singles out Great Britain as the first and perhaps best example of the public sphere of civil society. Three events in 1694 and 1695 mark its birth. Firstly, the establishment of parliamentary government. Secondly, the founding of the Bank of England to provide fiscal consolidation to a system up to that point held together by commerce. Finally, the elimination of censorship, which allowed for an 'influx' of rational-critical arguments into the press (perhaps it would be better to say: allowed for an influx of more challenging rational-critical arguments, since rational-critical arguments are as old as language). This influx, Habermas says, allowed the press to evolve into an instrument capable of bringing political decisions 'before the new forum of the public' (58).
Herein Habermas' legacy, sifted. The second half of the book, we repeat, will argue that the European public sphere is not a legacy fully accepted in the present and jealously guarded by the continent, but remains instead a legacy to come. One day Europe, too, might receive its own legacy.
Lima and a literary public sphere
The differences between Habermas' eighteenth-century blueprint of the European but also servants and apprentices learned the art of critical-rational public debate through its contact with court society and displayed it in the coffee houses, salons and neither constitutes a democratic milieu nor hosts a fully-fledged network of bourgeois commercial ties, city and periodical are no strangers to either phenomenon. Indeed, it was more common in the colonies than in the metropolis for nobles to be engaged in commerce, such was the need to distinguish themselves from indians (Clément, 75) .
The status of the periodical is less clear, ironically, in the sphere of culture. As soon as we turn its pages does it not become glaringly apparent that the Mercurio cannot but fail Habermas' censorship test? Do not its contents immediately signal its affiliation to the ancien régime, its 'sacred obligations' tie it straight back to a traditional Catholic as much as monarchical order, and its general contours reinforce rather than undermine the conventional idea that the eighteenth-century Hispanic public sphere, such as it is, is the most uncritical, therefore the most unpublic, public sphere imaginable? If, as we suspect, the public sphere is really Habermas' name for the site of Enlightenment, this view of an unpublic Hispanic public sphere amounts to a familiar claim, which is also a Habermasian claim: namely, that since Enlightenment is essentially opposed to religion (concesso non dato), then the most religious parts of the world, such as the Hispanic parts of the world which had long been part of a much older, Catholic sphere, the communitas christianae, are necessarily the most inimical to Enlightenment. interested souls uncomfortable with truth should object to such criticisms. Nor that the prejudiced, ignorant vulgo-a term that elsewhere does not just designate the lowborn-should resist the truth. 9 In truth, it continues, if one wanted to please the multitude it would frequently be necessary to adopt ideas that go against true reason (la recta razon). The implication here is that one should be careful about public opinion. A critical opinion, the Mercurio insinuates, must in certain respects be resolutely unpublic, that is, not conform to public opinion, and certainly not always please the vulgo (which, we repeat, does not just mean the low-born).
But the real import of this meditation is revealed in a footnote on the recent censorship by the Inquisition of five European periodical papers. The Mercurio wants to make its own position plain (in truth, it never has just one position):
El Gobierno, y el Tribunal de la fe jamas olvidan la solicitud de reprimir las producciones relativamente nocivas á la Religion, y al Estado. Baxo de la proteccion del primero, y en la esperanza de no merecer la censura del segundo, se han dado á luz, corren, y correrán nuestros Periodicos sin desviarse del principal objeto para que fueron establecidos. (II, 169) The Mercurio respects government and the Inquisition, will seek protection from the former and try not to be censored by the latter, but will do all this without deviating from the main goal for which it was established. This is no vow of silence and does not amount to refusing to take sides in public debate. The new periodical, it continues, will have the 'buenos y sensatos' on its side, while those who criticise it will recognise themselves in the defects it highlights. However, without declaring what its principal objeto is (anyone who has read the periodical knows it to be: the Enlightenment of Peru), the writer is tentatively articulating what the Mercurio is not principally concerned with, namely, the official politics of the viceroyalty, which it will leave to the public authorities and to gacetas.
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In the continuation to the article, 'Concluye el Discurso Antecedente' (6 November), the Mercurio takes its distance from periodicals, such as its new, sister paper in Santa Fe, which is happy to pass judgement on the recent peace between Spain and Great Britain (which it thinks will be short-lived and offer few benefits to Spaniards The position adopted by the Mercurio was articulated on 3 November (true philosophers are neither libertines nor fanatics but use their 'lights' for communal happiness) and is underscored in the final point of its résumé of the discourses offered by Santa Fe: 'los verdaderos derechos de la libertad del hombre, ennoblecidos, y conservados baxo el suave yugo de una legitima subordinacion y dependencia' (166).
The rights of the freedoms of man are ennobled and preserved under the gentle yoke of a legitimate subordination, viz. to the public and spiritual authorities. Now, what cannot be determined absolutely from the above is whether the Mercurio's statement of 6
November is a statement of belief (we believe periodicals, as opposed to gacetas, should not dissent from either the public or spiritual authorities), of tactical necessity (we had better believe it) or of a double consciousness (we believe we believe it, but we also believe in certain other things that might not coincide with the government's or the Inquisition's understanding of 'legitimate subordination').
However, above and beyond attempts to reconstruct the intended meaning of the term 'subordination' in this context, and before concluding hastily that this is merely the expression of a willingness to self-censor political opinions in an act of subordination to
Crown and Church, confirming in the process Whitaker's (1961, 5-6) view that the Hispanic Enlightenment was not about politics but rather practical problem-solving, it is worth considering the Mercurio's principal objeto invoked above. It is the difference between Habermas' political public sphere and a literary public sphere, a difference that belongs also to the internal history of the printed press (to the distinction between gacetas and periódicos).
Mercurial reason
The principal objeto of the Mercurio Peruano would appear to be the 12 And a patria with a distinctive-glorious, imperial-past is nothing less than a nación. Contributors to the Mercurio manage variously to call the territory 'Peru', 'Nacion', 'pais', 'patria', 'República', and even 'Imperio Peruano' (28 April, 7
August).
The simple point is this: the Mercurio Peruano does not appear to challenge or even to bring 'before the new forum of the public' (Habermas) 'las determinaciones de los Gabinetes' (that is for gacetas). But it does something arguably more political. It attempts to constitute a dramatic new forum. The Mercurio does not just report on an Enlightened patria, but rather attempts to construct-with all its blindspots-an Enlightened nación through the very act of sharing knowledge in the public sphere which it is in turn striving to configure. To return to what was said earlier: no doubt political, economic, social and cultural factors help foster the conditions of production necessary for a public sphere. But an exclusively contextualist explanation elides the particular productive force of the act and actor of critical reason in the formation of the new context.
We are close here to François-Xavier Guerra's (2009) thesis on the new form of sociability, associationism, which, he claims, enters the Hispanic world with modernity.
Not without its problems, Guerra's 'strong' reading holds that most social and political theories in the Spanish-speaking world up until the eighteenth century were based on an imaginary that took society to be structured by groups or corps-the traditional Hispanic 'sociedad estamental'. In this traditional order, the ties of social actors do not depend on the will of the individual but rather on birth into a particular class, pueblo or ethnic group. Individual will, such as it is, is subordinated to the will of the corporate body or estate. According to Guerra, this is not the case in modernity. Modernity knows associations of individuals-and this is the key point-whose legitimacy comes from association itself, that is, from the will of associates. Guerra (113) calls it the 'invention of the individual'. And he sees clearly-and this is one of his greatest insights-the profound kinship between the absolutist imaginary and the Enlightenment (and even revolutionary) imaginary that runs parallel to it. Both absolutism and Enlightenment share hostility towards corporate bodies and their privileges, and both, albeit for different reasons, make the individual into the normative subject of institutions and values. Notwithstanding certain irreducible problems with the archetypes at the root of Guerra's thesis (rather than say that a sociability of knowledge is exclusive to modern times, and therefore alien to Hispanic cultures-because, according to the archetype, the pre-modern, corporatist Hispanic world shares none of the material or symbolic resources of the modern, individualistic world-it might be precisely more reasonable to say that it is more dominant in modern times), Guerra nonetheless draws us to the following possibility: that in the Sociedad Académica de Amantes de Lima that underpinned the Mercurio Peruano people came together (certain creoles and peninsulares came together), theoretically at least, as free individuals. 'Sociedad estamental', yes; but in one space at least, Sociedad Académica. No association without the will of the associates qua independent critical participants. primitivo es la union y recíproco amor de los hombres, vinculándolos por el conocimiento de la dependencia en que mutuamente los constituye la opinion, y la necesidad' ('Nuevos establecimientos de buen gusto ', 26 May, II, 66) . This is a petition for the autonomous power of knowledge and commerce. Men are bound together (though possible to read in the neutral form, as 'humankind', the subjects are almost always male), not by virtue of the sovereign's will and not even by any social pact, but by economic need and a philosophical activity in the doing of which they learn of the dependencies involved in knowledge (opinion). There is another hint of this same idea in the great 'dissertation' on the history of commerce in Peru that runs across eight issues and invokes the social and political ties (enlazes sociales y politicos) which only commerce can provide 'Modernas Naciones' with-it being understood that commercial ties are the equivalent of the philosophical ties that bind the members of an association into a different sociability. 14 But we shall end with the idea's appearance in a locus classicus of the literary public sphere, the eighteenth-century café.
'Rasgo histórico y filosófico sobre los cafées de Lima' (10 February 1791) is a good example of the Mercurio's patriotic empiricist historiography, committed to rescuing the ordinary and the abject from, as it puts it elsewhere, all those systematising histories and geographies of the country compiled 'en las orillas del Sena, y del Támesis'. 15 It is in the ordinary fragments of the patria, despised by foreign scholars, that one can divine 'the civil system'.The piece recalls how cafés in Spain were originally built on top of Alogerías and that coffee first came into Spain with the Arabs, along with a fragment of the Arabic language, the word cafée coming from cahué (in fact, originally qahwa). These useful houses first put down roots in Lima in 1771, before which there was no public café, partly because mate, owing to the care and time needed to prepare and consume it, was not compatible with the publicness (publicidad) of a shop. The first Lima café was established by Don Francisco Serio in Calle de Santo Domingo. The second followed a year later. Earnings from the cafés are thought to be considerable. Now there are six of them-many with billiards and truco tables, all selling iced drinks and other beverages and most being especially busy first thing in the morning and at siesta time.
Three things merit attention in respect of the question of the public sphere. 1) First, the 'civil system'. Here is not the place to dwell at any length on this theme. Let us just say that, despite the presence in the piece of certain traditional Catholic topoi, the writer ultimately attributes the founding of establishments of the polis such as cafés to the sistema civil de la República (again this is clearly a creole, as opposed to indigenous, project). Empirical study of cafés will reveal not the hand of God or even of the monarchy so much as the hand of the civil system. 2) Second, authority. Viceroy himself, the writer claims, would like such concurrencias to unite man with man, to develop a uniformity of character among men, and even to increase the circulation of goods and thereby contribute to the comfort of locals and to providing them with an innocent diversion:
como quiera que las concurrencias, practicadas con aquella moderacion, decencia y honestidad que son características del genio Peruano, unen el hombre al hombre, concilian la uniformidad del caracter, aumentan la circulacion y los recursos de subsistencia, contribuyen a la comodidad de los vecinos, y les proporcionan un recreo inocente. Tambien la Ciudad no miró con repugnancia la introduccion de esta moda. (I, 110) This is the classic Enlightenment theme, with added mate and local street names, of cafés as the site of a new form of would-be egalitarian sociability based on reason.
3) Third and finally, there is the question of the publicness of the reason of the public sphere. What, the writer says, will those critics who want the Mercurio to be merely a vehicle of adulation or a publiciser of private feelings (sentimientos privados) say of this account of Lima's cafés? He does not care. We do not write, he writes, just for the capital, or for the year 1791, but work for everyone and for posterity (para la noticia de todo el mundo, y para la posteridad). To that end it just might be that one day, in this or in the other hemisphere, news of the cafés of Lima is appreciated more than the oft-repeated accounts of wars, conquest and settlement (fundacion). Two themes intertwine here. First, the periodical confines itself neither to the private sphere of private feelings nor to the official-honourific-adulatory-discourse of the state sphere; rather, it is implied, it mixes the two spheres. This crossing of the private and the public coincides with Habermas' definition of the public sphere of civil society.
Precisely in support of such a crossing, future historians, the author writes, will use cafés (rather than the grand affairs of state) as material with which to write the history of the capital, the history of how it thought and of how it began to emulate and even surpass (sobrepujar) the coffee houses of Europe. All of which means, of course: as material testifying to the greatness of the sistema civil de la República. Secondly, and as hinted at earlier, agents of what we have been calling the literary public sphere must necessarily countenance the possibility that their public works might always be unpublic, that is, not quite correspond to the majority view of the public sphere in its present configuration. 16 The true dimensions of their reason may only be recognised at a later time, the time of la posteridad. This reminds us that the (literary) public sphere is neither truly public nor truly spherical but always taking shape.
Conclusion
The presence and nature of the Mercurio Peruano in Lima in 1791 suggests a 'sphere of private people come together as a public' and hints that concern not just over public affairs but over the very status of the patria was 'no longer confined to the authorities but was considered by the subjects as one that was properly theirs'. On occasion-and we must be clear about this-patriotic historiography in the Mercurio is indistinguishable from the most traditional discourse of Empire. 17 At other times, however, even when the highbrow style of the Mercurio seems to reinforce another traditional civilising mission, namely, the High Literary civilising mission of creole and peninsular elites, the Mercurio shared (its) critical reason. Doubtless certain local and transatlantic political, economic, social and cultural conditions made possible the configuration of a Peruvian literary public sphere of sorts. But the latter was also made possible by this (heterogeneous) critical reason. Here was an instrument not just bringing news of the polis 'before the new forum of the public', as though the public already existed as an empirical subject before and in advance of all articulations of it, but rather endeavouring to constitute a public. In this delicate, always incomplete public sphere we encounter two further possibilities. First, an altered understanding of 'modernity' in the colonies: an uncertain, contradictory modernity (emancipatory and exclusive) at work before the official founding of the nation-state, taking shape in close proximity to the forms and functions of the ancien régime, and moving, like quicksilver, in the interstices of formal politics. Second, and going beyond Guerra, the possibility that in the exercise of critical reason what is called Enlightened modernity, with all its blindspots, has always already been under way. This is another way of saying that critical reason has always already been producing the conditions of and for the (literary) public sphere.
